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For the past 40 years, the United States has implemented what is tantamount to 
a de facto domestic intelligence enterprise, which is comprised of a constellation 
of several state, local, and federal partners. It could be reasonably stated that 
these partners came into being for a few different reasons, (1) to demonstrate 
action following seminal event or crisis, (2) to address an unmet or previously 
unanticipated need, or (3) to comply with a policy or legal initiative. Since the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, several national strategies and 
information-sharing initiatives have been implemented that compel these entities 
to engage in more robust collaborative activities. 
This thesis summarizes three selected elements of the domestic 
intelligence enterprise, which are missioned to provide a variety of services to 
state and local homeland security stakeholders, and introduces the concept of 
collective impact as a possible framework for enhanced collaboration. 
Additionally, it examines how each element, within its internal network, may 
already be practicing the core concepts of collective impact and offers 
recommendations for how cross-network implementation of collective impact may 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Over the past 40 years, the United States has implemented a de facto domestic 
intelligence enterprise that is comprised of a constellation of over 268 local, state, 
and federal partners.1 It could be argued that most of the elements of the 
enterprise came into existence by one of three means: in response to a crisis, to 
fulfill an unmet need, or to satisfy the requirements of legislative action. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the elements of the domestic intelligence enterprise 
examined are state and local fusion centers, high intensity drug trafficking area 
(HIDTA) investigative support centers (ISCs), and regional information sharing 
system (RISS) centers. These elements were chosen because they are 
comprised of networks, which are “closest to the ground.” In other words, they 
are specifically missioned to support state and local law enforcement, and 
ostensibly, those closest to the greatest volume of raw information.  
Whether the problem set is narcotics, terrorism, or organized crime, it 
could be said that each of the elements has been engaged in a pattern of 
Isolated Impact, which assumes the following. Funds are allocated to individual 
organizations that offer the most promising solutions, those organizations work 
separately and compete to produce the greatest independent impact, evaluation 
of efforts is isolated to that organization, and larger-scale progress against the 
problem is dependent upon scaling a single organization.2 This begs the 
question, and provides the underlying inquiry of this thesis. Do independent, 
isolated efforts only represent a surrogate for real impact against the issue, or 
might a better framework exist for cross-element collaboration? Therefore, the 
primary question this thesis intends to ask is if a common framework for 
collaboration should be adopted between these elements in an effort to better 
                                            
1 Brian A. Jackson, ed. Considering the Creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency in the 
United States: Lessons learned from the Experiences of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 2009). 
2 John Kania and Mark Kramer, “Collective Impact,” Stanford Social Innovation Review 1, no. 
9 (2011): 36–41. 
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coordinate activities and evaluate the impact of their operation. This thesis 
introduces the collaborative framework of collective impact (CI) as it has been 
applied in the realm of non-profit organizations and investigates how it may apply 
to selected elements of the domestic intelligence enterprise. Whereas CI is 
defined as “the commitment of a group of actors from different sectors to a 
common agenda for solving a complex social problem,”3 it assumes that the 
following five conditions exist within any problem space with which the three 
elements wish to collaborate. 
 Common Agenda 
 Shared Measurement 
 Mutually Reinforcing Activities 
 Continuous Communication 
 Backbone Support4 
One of the key findings discovered through the research process was that 
the three elements examined might already be leveraging key concepts 
associated with CI within their networks. However, opportunities exist for these 
elements to enhance the CI model of collaboration between the networks. 
Finally, strong evidence is available in the form of some new and existing 
regional and cross-element projects that demonstrate the desire to enhance 
collaboration in innovative ways. These advances, however, could be bolstered 
by additional work and inquiry in the following areas. 
 Consideration of policy changes with respect to funding that allow 
for longer-term planning with respect to strategic goals 
 Mutually shared collection and reporting priorities across the 
enterprise 
 Continued federation of technology platforms 
                                            
3 Kania and Kramer, “Collective Impact,” 36–41. 
4 Ibid. 
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 Development of common metrics and measures that empirically 
illustrate the relationship between information sharing and impact 
on a problem set 
 Recognition of the value of competitive analysis by including all 
elements of the enterprise in exercises and “red team” operations 
No doubt exists that the domestic intelligence enterprise in the United 
States serves a very impactful purpose and the capabilities built have enhanced 
and encouraged collaboration on levels never before imagined. Whether 
established by legal mandate, in response to a crisis, or a natural need to 
cooperate, deliberate and planned collaboration has replaced most of the 
“random acts of partnership”5 from the past. However, giving credit to the 
successes to date, any enterprise, which is so complex and has such a far-
reaching mission, can benefit from the innovation and fresh inquiry collective 
impact offers. 
                                            
5 “The ‘How To’ Guide,’ Collaboration for Impact,” accessed July 15, 2014, http://www. 
collaborationforimpact.com/the-how-to-guide/. 
 xviii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would first like to dedicate this effort to my parents, who always 
impressed upon me the importance of education and the truth that learning is a 
lifelong process. I would also like to thank my sisters and my friends who have 
endured this process with me and supported me with their understanding and 
encouragement.  
To the amazing instructors and staff at the Center for Homeland Defense 
and Security, your time, support and expertise made this entire process possible. 
I would also like to thank the members of Cohorts 1301 and 1302. The 
collaboration and fellowship we shared both inside the classroom and out made 
the entire course enjoyable. I am truly honored to count you among my 
colleagues.  
Finally, to my advisor and second reader, Erik Dahl and John Rollins. 
Without your patience and leadership, this effort would not have come to 
completion. In addition, to Dr. Bellavita, whose article presented a new 
framework of thought for me, thank you for your inspiration. 
 xx




In tackling information issues, America needs unity of effort. 
–The 9/11 Commission Report 
 
 
Soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, policy makers in 
the United States (U.S.) began to debate and examine ways to improve how the 
country does the business of intelligence, information sharing, and domestic 
security. One of the most profound actions the U.S. government took following 
the terrorist attacks resulted in the largest reorganization of government in the 
republic’s history. The newly-created U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) combined, amalgamated, and merged all or part of 22 different 
departments into a single cabinet-level organization in an effort to form a single, 
unified homeland security structure tasked to “improve protection against today’s 
threats and be flexible enough to help meet the unknown threats of the future.1 In 
addition, in a further effort to remedy the well-documented intelligence and 
information-sharing failures leading up to September 11, 2001, President George 
W. Bush proposed that:  
[T]he new Department would contain a unit whose sole mission is 
to assemble, fuse, and analyze relevant intelligence data from 
government sources, including CIA, NSA, FBI, INS, DEA, DOE, 
Customs, and DOT, and data gleaned from other organizations and 
public sources. With this big-picture view, the Department would be 
more likely to spot trends and would be able to direct resources at a 
moment’s notice to help thwart a terrorist attack.2 
 
 
                                            
1 George W. Bush, The Department of Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, June 2002). 
2 Ibid. 
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Additionally, claiming, “the Federal Bureau of Investigation had failed to 
merge properly and perform effectively its dual missions of law enforcement and 
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of foreign intelligence inside the 
United States,”3 Senator Edwards introduced a bill in 2003 titled the Foreign 
Intelligence Collection Improvement Act of 2003. The bill advocated for the 
establishment of a new member of the United States Intelligence Community 
called the Homeland Intelligence Agency.4 Although unsuccessful, Edwards’ bill 
recognized the importance of the state and local role in the larger intelligence 
community.  
While each of the efforts mentioned above shows the importance of, and 
strategic intent to identify, formalize, and in some cases, create new relationships 
between existing intelligence practitioners, the United States chose not to pursue 
the creation of a single domestic intelligence agency. Rather, it chose the path of 
reform through creating an environment of greater collaboration and engagement 
with state and local entities, and with existing organizations, which were already 
engaged in the collection and analysis of criminal intelligence.  
The goal of this thesis is to introduce a new framework of collaboration for 
similar elements of the domestic intelligence enterprise, and make 
recommendations, which may increase the effectiveness and impact of those 
entities. The next section of this chapter provides an overview of the domestic 
intelligence enterprise at large, and the following section describes the 
importance of collaboration and introduces the concept of collective impact (CI).  
 
                                            
3 Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act of 2003. 
4 Todd Masse, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model 
to the United States (CRS Report No. RL31920) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2003). 
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A. OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICAN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE 
ENTERPRISE 
Over the past 40 years, the United States has implemented several 
elements of what could be construed to be a domestic intelligence enterprise 
(enterprise), with the most recent addition being the national network of fusion 
centers. It could be accurately stated that each of the elements of the enterprise 
came into being as a response to three different, albeit abstractly related 
reasons: (1) to demonstrate action following a seminal event or crisis, (2) to 
address an unmet or previously unanticipated need, or (3) to comply with a policy 
or legal initiative. In its current state, the enterprise in the United States is 
comprised of a constellation of state, local, and federal partners, and while no 
consensus definition of domestic intelligence has been established in law or 
public policy,5 the Rand Corporation defines it as: 
Efforts by government organizations to gather, assess and act on 
information about individuals or organizations in the United States 
or U.S. persons elsewhere that is not necessarily related to the 
investigation of a known past criminal act or specific planned 
criminal activity.6 
In President George W. Bush’s 2002 National Homeland Security 
Strategy, the DHS, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) were identified as the primary responsible parties for 
information and analysis relating to homeland security (as indicated in Figure 1). 
                                            
5 Todd Masse, Siobhan O’Neil, and John Rollins, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for 
Congress (CRS Report No. RL34070) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007). 
6 Gregory F. Treverton, “Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence, Assessing the Options,” 




Figure 1.  Roles and Responsibilities of Homeland Security Intelligence 
and Information Analysis7 
In addition to the groups in Figure 1, other principal entities currently 
comprising the enterprise are the following. 
 FBI Field Intelligence Groups (FIG)—Part of the FBI, this group 
supports FBI investigations through the collection and analysis of 
intelligence, and creates a variety of analytical products to inform 
the FBI’s law enforcement and intelligence partners. 
 Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) Centers—Funded 
by the Department of Justice (DOJ), this component supports 
regional law enforcement, public safety, and homeland security 




                                            
7 George W. Bush, The Department of Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, June 2002). 
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 State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers—Funded through a 
variety of federal and state resources, and in part through DHS and 
DOJ grants, fusion centers are state and locally owned, and 
operate as intermediaries for sharing terrorism and other threat-
related information between the federal government and state, 
local, tribal, territorial, and private-sector homeland security 
partners.  
 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Investigative 
Support Centers (ISC)—Funded through grants administered by 
the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), HIDTA ISCs 
aim to support the disruption and dismantlement of drug-trafficking 
and money-laundering organizations through the prevention and 
mitigation of associated activity.8 
 
Further, as of January 2013, 268 units of five major types of field-based 
entities (FBI joint terrorism task force, FBI field intelligence Group, regional 
information sharing centers, state and local fusion centers, and high intensity 
drug trafficking area investigative support centers), many co-located with one 
another, were situated throughout the United States (as illustrated in Figure 2).9 
 
                                            
8 Government Accountability Office, Information Sharing. Agencies Could Better Coordinate 
to Reduce Overlap in Field-Based Activities (GAO-13-471) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 




Figure 2.  Geographic Location of Selected Elements of the Domestic 
Intelligence Enterprise10 
Figure 3 more visually represents the network structure of the enterprise 
and illustrates: (1) how loosely, if at all, each of the elements is connected, (2) 
how each is organized around a specific mission set, and (3) how these partners 
could become isolated from one another and the larger network without strong 
collaborative ties. 
                                            
10 Government Accountability Office, Information Sharing. Agencies Could Better Coordinate 
to Reduce Overlap in Field-Based Activities, 1–2. 
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Figure 3.  Network Structure of the Enterprise1 
                                            




B. WHY COLLABORATION IS IMPORTANT IN THE PRACTICE OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY 
One of the underlying and perhaps most critical missions of the DHS is 
improving the effectiveness of collaboration and information sharing among all 
levels of government within the United States. This nation’s weakness in these 
areas was exploited by al-Qaeda in the lead up to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. In addition, considering the findings of the 9/11 
Commission Report, collaboration, or joint action, stands to benefit all involved in 
the homeland security practice by engaging in joint planning, ensuring a unified 
effort by identifying definitive leadership, and mitigating the gaps created by 
critical shortages of experts.1 While it will never be possible to know if these 
activities would have prevented the attacks, it stands to reason that a culture of 
“need to share” rather than “need to know”2 prior to September 11, 2001 could 
have increased the odds of seizing on any one of the 10 operational 
opportunities to disrupt the attacks identified by the 9/11 Commission.3  
While not related to terrorism, but nonetheless important, the response to 
Hurricane Katrina again exposed U.S. vulnerabilities within and across 
organizational and jurisdictional boundaries. Throughout the event, a number of 
breakdowns in collaboration were evident: a lack of information sharing among 
agencies, confused inter-organizational relationships, competing roles and 
responsibilities, and shortcomings in leadership.4  
The response to man-made and natural disasters have many things in 
common, the most impactful of which may be that they are both complex 
                                            
1 Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States, The 9/11 Commission report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States, 2004), 401. 
2 Ibid., 24. 
3 Ibid., 8–9. 
4 Susan Page Hocevar, Gail Fann Thomas, and Erik Jansen, “Inter-Organizational 
Collaboration: Addressing the Challenge,” Homeland Security Affairs 7, The 9/11 Essays 
(September 2011): 4. 
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problems that require capabilities of many disciplines that have both aligned and 
competing interests, and usually function without an over-arching command 
authority.5 With the recent designation of the intelligence/investigations function 
as a section level stakeholder in the National Incident Management System,6 and 
with a substantial number of state and local fusion centers co-located with either 
state or local emergency operations centers,7 and supporting all-hazards 
missions, the collection, analysis, and dissemination of threat information by 
fusion centers can inform both preplanning response activities, as well as 
operational response and coordination efforts during and after an incident or 
event.8 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Within key elements of the domestic intelligence enterprise—state and 
local fusion centers, RISS, and ISC—a shared mission exists, and in some 
cases, the entities are co-located. Considering these similarities, should the state 
and local fusion centers, RISS Centers and HIDTA ISCs adopt a common 
framework for collaboration and evaluation to coordinate activities and evaluate 
the impact of their operations better? Since the elements of the enterprise 
selected for this thesis are very similar, this thesis argues that the concept of CI 
offers such a common framework. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As the concept of CI is a newer approach to collaboration, limited 
scholarly research is available for study. However, several case studies and 
                                            
5 Ibid. 
6 Department of Homeland Security, NIMS Intelligence/Investigations Function Field 
Operations Guide (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013). 
7 Seventy-one percent of state and local fusion centers have an all-hazards mission; 46% are 
co-located with a state or local emergency operations center; and 58% assign personnel to 
emergency management and/or emergency operations centers during events or incidents.  
8 Department of Homeland Security, Fusion Center and Emergency Management 
Collaboration Meeting After-Action Report (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
2014).  
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historical examples of what can be categorized as CI before the idea was labeled 
as such do exist. In general, CI is a new way of framing collaborative efforts 
around a common goal. The area in which CI may differ from other collaborative 
frameworks is the stipulation that each group wishing to participate in the 
collaborative effort must relinquish, to some degree, its individual agenda in the 
pursuit of the overall objective. This literature review defines and describes the 
domestic intelligence enterprise in the United States, and also summarizes other 
writing on collaboration. 
1. The Domestic Intelligence Enterprise, in General 
Homeland security is a uniquely American concept. It is a product 
of American geographic isolation and the strong tendency 
throughout American history to believe that there was a clear divide 
between events, issues and problems outside the U.S. borders and 
those inside the U.S. Borders.9 
However, many countries around the world have been engaged in 
practices similar to the American concept for many years whose efforts may be 
instructive, albeit without the considerable constraints and protections of the U.S. 
Constitution.10 Along with the idea of a government enterprise focused on 
domestic security (the DHS), it could reasonably be assumed that an 
accompanying intelligence capability is critical to its success. Rather than 
establishing a monolithic national domestic intelligence structure, policy makers 
recognized the importance of local law enforcement as a critical component of 
this nation’s security capability, as both “first preventers” and “first responders.”11 
As a viable alternative to a national intelligence agency, experts have said that 
this approach is effective in that the public generally trusts local law enforcement, 
and it is easier to calibrate and focus. However, oversight becomes more 
                                            
9 Nadav Morag, “Does Homeland Security Exist Outside the United States?” Homeland 
Security Affairs, 7, The 9/11 Essays (September 2011): 1. 
10 Ibid. 
11 The White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing, Success and Challenges in 
Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing (Washington, DC: The White House, 2007), 10. 
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complicated with more local parties involved.12 This shift in national security 
responsibility has been quietly unfolding since the attacks on September 11, 
2001, as evidenced by the introduction of state and locally owned fusion centers. 
Despite its decentralized structure, the structure currently in place in the United 
States is more coordinated and also more effective than most Americans realize, 
and constitutes a de facto—but little understood—domestic intelligence system.13 
2. Collaboration Matters 
Collaboration and information sharing are often at the center of the 
intelligence debate. However, one view is consistent; intelligence and 
information-sharing failures, such as those that preceded the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, often stimulate debate to remedy what are real or 
perceived functional, procedural, regulatory, systemic, and/or structural 
problems.14 Following the mandates of Executive Order 13356 and Section 1016 
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), an 
information sharing environment (ISE) was established for counterterrorism, 
weapons of mass destruction, and homeland security information.15 The IRTPA 
also established an information-sharing council whose duties, among others, was 
to ensure coordination among federal partners and make recommendations as to 
how the ISE could be extended to incorporate appropriate state and local 
authorities.16 Also, rather than mandating a centralized terrorism information 
database, the IRTPA required that the ISE connect existing systems, be 
decentralized, and allow operations among and between all levels of government 
as appropriate, which spurred an unprecedented level of collaboration between a 
                                            
12 “Intelligence Reform: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom Part 2,” Mike German and 
Erik Dahl, July 15, 2014, NPS Video. 
13 Erik J. Dahl, “Domestic Intelligence Today More Security but Less Liberty?” Homeland 
Security Affairs, 7, The 9/11 Essays (September 2011): 3. 
14 Masse, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the 
United States. 
15 6 USC 485 Section 1016 IRTPA 1016 (b) (1) (A). 
16 Ibid., (g) (1). 
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vast array of stakeholders in the newly formed practice of homeland security. 
While not applied specifically to domestic intelligence, or the partners, which are 
the focus of this thesis, the General Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a 
study, which could be instructive to the cross-agency initiatives of the enterprise. 
Its 2005 study, titled Results-Oriented Government, Practices That Can Help 
Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, identifies several 
characteristics—including leadership, trust, and organizational culture—that are 
necessary for a collaborative working relationship.17  
One collaborative framework, the inter-organizational collaborative 
capacity (ICC) model, is defined as “the capability of organizations (or a set of 
organizations) to enter into, develop, and sustain inter-organizational systems in 
pursuit of collective outcomes.”18 What is assumed is that each of the 
organizations will embrace five key factors to build collaborative capacity: (1) 
purpose and strategy, (2) lateral processes, (3) incentives and rewards, (4) 
structure, and (5) people. Of particular application to the enterprise, the ICC 
model places several organizations in a problem space and assumes deliberate 
leadership and alignment of organizational design elements toward 
collaboration.19 
Differing from the ICC, CI is a newer model for collaboration that is being 
leveraged by groups of government, nonprofit organizations, and community 
stakeholders. Recognizing that some tasks are larger and more complex than 
any one organization can effectively manage, the collective resources and talents 
of interested parties are pooled and focused toward a shared vision for change. 
Dispensing with the inefficiencies of isolated impact, in which numerous 
                                            
17 Government Accountability Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of 
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. Results-Oriented Government 
Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies (GAO-06-
15) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, October 2005). 
18 As quoted in Hocevar, Fann Thomas, and Jansen, “Inter-Organizational Collaboration: 
Addressing the Challenge.” 
19 Ibid. 
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organizations separately compete for resources,20 participants in a CI initiative 
agree to work cooperatively under the following five key conditions. 
 Common agenda 
 Shared measurement 
 Mutually reinforcing activities 
 Continuous communication  
 Backbone support21 
CI also assumes that the goal is long-term in nature, requires supporting 
infrastructure to build processes, and requires funders to shift their perspective to 
support a new approach.22 While the intentions, goals and/or outputs may be 
similar between the two models, CI is distinctly different in that it involves a 
centralized infrastructure, dedicated staff, and a structured process that leads to 
a common agenda, shared measurement, continuous communication, and 
mutually reinforcing activities.23 
In applying these theories of collaboration, CI more closely resembles a 
federation of organizations. In other words, the constituent elements of a 
federation, by definition, relinquish some degree of authority to a more central 
body. Moreover, the ICC more closely resembles a community, wherein it is 
implied that a group of persons or entities merely have common interests, but are 
not necessarily bound together by any formal power sharing arrangements or 
                                            
20 Fay Hanleybrown, John Kania, and Mark Kramer, “Channeling Change: Making Collective 
Impact Work,” Stanford Social Innovation Review, January 26, 2012, http://www.ssireview. 
org/blog/entry/channeling_change_making_collective_impact_work. 
21 John Kania and Mark Kramer, “Collective Impact,” Stanford Social Innovation Review 1, 
no. 9 (2011): 36–41. 
22 Chris Thompson, “Rereading Collective Impact: Three Lessons,” Stanford Social 
Innovation Review, February 3, 2014. 
23 Kania and Kramer, “Collective Impact,” 36–41. 
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agreements.24 Considering the relatively early establishment of the RISS centers 
and the later addition of the HIDTA ISCs, it could be argued that state and local 
intelligence capabilities have been the silent backbone of larger domestic 
intelligence efforts for at least the past 40 years, even if only recently, they have 
been included in national-level strategies. 
In subsequent chapters, this thesis evaluates the advantages and 
disadvantages of fusion centers, RISS centers and HIDTA ISCs adopting a new 
framework of collaboration based on CI. Chapter II introduces and further defines 
the concept of CI. Chapters III, IV, and V provide a brief history of each of the 
elements, and how they may already be using the framework. Chapter VI 
describes what steps could be taken to bolster the collaborative bonds of these 
three very similar, yet uniquely missioned organizations utilizing the CI 
framework, and also identifies areas of further study as they relate to the 
application of CI to the domestic intelligence enterprise. 
                                            
24 Mark A. Randol, The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: 
Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress (CRS Report No. R40602) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 16–17. 
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II. ON COLLABORATION 
‘Tis profitable for us both, that I should labour with you today,  




Although it may seem obvious that organizations accomplish more when 
they work together, no commonly accepted definition of collaboration exists. For 
the purposes of this thesis, collaboration is defined as “any joint activity by two or 
more organizations that is intended to produce more public value than could be 
produced when the organizations act alone.”25 While this definition seems simple 
enough, organizations can benefit from deploying a collaborative framework that 
more specifically defines goals, roles, responsibilities, and expected outcomes. In 
its 2005 study titled, Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration 
among Federal Agencies, the GAO identified eight practices that can enhance 
and sustain collaborative efforts between organizations.  
 Define and articulate a common outcome 
 Establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies 
 Identify and address needs by leveraging resources 
 Agree on roles and responsibilities 
 Establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to 
operate across agency boundaries 
 Develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results 
 Reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through 
agency plans and reports 
                                            
25 Eugene Bardach, Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of 
Managerial Craftsmanship (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998). 
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 Reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts through 
performance management systems26 
While the GAO’s criteria are useful, it could be constructive for public 
managers first to consider a few more broad topics related to their prospective 
participation in a collaborative effort. The “strategic triangle” depicted in Figure 4 
asks government managers to focus on the larger, albeit no less complex, issues 
that they should consider before committing themselves and their organizations 
to a particular course of action. 
 What is the important public value the organization seeks to 
produce? 
 What sources of legitimacy and support would be relied upon to 
authorize the organization to take action and provide the resources 
necessary to sustain the effort to create that value? 
 What operational capabilities (including new investments and 
innovations) would the organization rely on (or have to develop) to 
deliver the desired results?27 
                                            
26 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can 
Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration Amount Federal Agencies (GAO-06-15) (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0615.pdf. 
27 Mark Moore and Sanjeev Khagra, On Creating Public Value: What Business Might Learn 
from Government about Strategic Management, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative 




Figure 4.  The Strategic Triangle28 
Considering the above defined, and larger ideas relating to collaboration, 
the remainder of this chapter provides more detail with respect to two models 
currently being leveraged in the government and in philanthropic/non-
government organization domains, ICC and CI.  
A. THE ICC MODEL 
While many models exist that describe collaboration, perhaps the most 
applicable to the domestic intelligence enterprise is the ICC model, which is 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
                                            




Figure 5.  Organizations in a Common Problem Space29 
The ICC model provides a mechanism to assess different factors that 
contribute to an organization’s capacity to collaborate with other organizations. It 
can serve as a framework to diagnose current collaborative capabilities and 
provide data to guide organizational changes to improve those capabilities. The 
                                            
29 Moore and Khagra, On Creating Public Value. 
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model is comprised of five organizational domains each with their individual 
factors.  
 Purpose and Strategy: It could be reasonably stated that purpose 
and strategy underlie any effort in which organizations desire to 
collaborate, and is comprised of three basic elements: (1) the need 
to collaborate, or felt need, (2) strategic action for collaboration, and 
(3) resource investments. Felt need, which is usually the catalyst 
for any collaborative effort, is the organization’s recognition of 
interdependence with others and the acknowledged need to 
collaborate to accomplish its mission and goals effectively. This 
need can either arise from a perceived threat or problem, or may 
simply be motivated by the desire for pro-action or prevention. 
Strategic action considers the larger goals for the interaction and 
resource investments simply identify the human and monetary 
resources necessary to support the effort.  
 Structure: Building on purpose and strategy; structure is necessary 
to define roles and responsibilities and considers flexibility when 
needed. Within the structure between organizations also exists 
opportunities for individual collaborative efforts by “boundary 
spanners;” it follows that the stronger the ties between these 
individuals, the more productive the effort. Finally, metrics identify 
established criteria and performance standards by which the 
success of the effort is evaluated. 
 Rewards and Incentives: Impacting more the individual than the 
organization, rewards and incentives can include promotions and 
special recognition; however, individuals may also gain a sense of 
reward from enhanced relationships and greater job satisfaction. 
 People: Each individual’s collaborative capacity. In other words, 
their attitudes, skills, and knowledge have the propensity to affect 
the collaborative effort between organizations. In addition, an 
individual’s conflict management skills, willingness to share 
decision-making responsibilities, and familiarity of how the other 
organizations function can impact the overall effort. 
 Lateral Mechanisms: This domain includes the “hard” and “soft” 
aspects of lateral coordination. Whereas social capital and trust 
represent the soft aspects, collaborative tools and technology 
comprise the hard aspects. The two, however, are interdependent 
and can have a profound impact on the success, or failure of a 
collaborative effort.30 
                                            
30 Hocevar, Fann Thomas, and Jansen, “Inter-Organizational Collaboration: Addressing the 
Challenge.” 
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The ICC represents more of a description of the “how” of collaboration.31 It 
builds on and further develops the broad ideas of the 2005 GAO study titled 
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 
Collaboration among Federal Agencies, and begins to define how organizations 
inhabit a problem space separately, reasons why they (should) interact, and how 
they can build capacity together without any amalgamation. 
1. Examples of Inter-Organizational Collaborative Capacity 
It can reasonably argued that most state, local, and federal law 
enforcement task forces emulate the factors, which comprise the ICC. One 
example, which is especially germane to this thesis, is the FBI’s Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces (JTTF). However, before the first JTTF was established, and 
ostensibly became the model for several similar such task forces; the New York 
City Police Department in 1979 combined federal and local law enforcement 
capabilities to investigate an overwhelming number of bank robberies.32 Growing 
from the original successful collaboration relating to bank robberies, the first 
JTTF was established in New York City in 1980. Since then, the number of 
individuals assigned to JTTFs has grown to over 4,200 members from over 600 
state and local agencies and 50 federal agencies. JTTFs have been formed in 
103 cities across the United States, with a total of 71 established since the 
terrorist attacks of September 11.33 
When considering the elements of ICC, it is apparent that the JTTF 
template, whether intentional or not, bears close resemblance as follows. 
 A felt need supplements the capabilities of the FBI with the unique 
investigative abilities of state and local law enforcement 
                                            
31 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can 
Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration Amount Federal Agencies. 
32 “History of the JTTF,” Anti-Defamation League, The Joint Terrorism Task Force, 2005, 
http://archive.adl.org/learn/jttf/history_jttf.html. 
33 “Protecting America from Terrorist Attack, Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, accessed July 2, 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/ 
terrorism_jttfs. 
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 A structure is in place by way of memoranda of understanding and 
internal task force chain of command 
 Being chosen to participate as a task force officer is often 
considered prestigious not only for the individual, but shows that 
the officers’ home agency has cultivated considerable investigative 
talent within its ranks 
 Task force officers are largely chosen because they possess a skill 
set desired by the FBI, chiefly among them, the ability to work 
effectively with a team 
 Both organizations benefit from the lateral processes of one 
another, which presumably results in a greater impact on the issue 
This model is duplicated throughout the federal government with many 
similar such task forces, for example: the U.S. Marshal Service’s fugitive task 
forces, the DOJ’s Organized crime drug enforcement task forces, the Internal 
Revenue Service’s financial crimes task forces, and the U.S. Secret Service’s 
electronic crimes task forces, and so on. 
B. COLLECTIVE IMPACT 
As defined in the Stanford Social Innovation Review, CI is “the 
commitment of a group of actors from different sectors to a common agenda for 
solving a complex social problem.”34 CI can be further described as an emerging 
strategy to raise awareness and advocate for social change to build consensus 
and momentum among diverse groups behind a common cause. Non-
government organizations, non-profit organizations, and other special interest 
groups, sometimes in partnership with the government, are currently leveraging 
this strategy. While more commonly applied as an approach to secure funding, a 
core assumption of the CI strategy assumes that the chosen problem or issue is 
too large and complex for any singular group to solve, and only through coalitions 
of diverse cross-sector partners can an impact be made.  
                                            
34 Kania and Kramer, “Collective Impact,” 36–41. 
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The concept and strategy of CI assumes that the five conditions in Table 1 
exist and are agreed upon by each of the parties wishing to participate in the 
identified initiative or goal. 
Table 1.   Conditions of Collective Impact35 
The Five Conditions of Collective Impact 
Common Agenda 
All participants have a shared vision for change including a common 
understanding of the problem and a joint approach to solving it through 
agreed upon actions 
Shared Measurement 
Collecting data and measuring results consistently across all 




Participant activities must be differentiated while still being coordinated 
through a mutually reinforcing plan of action. 
Continuous 
Communication 
Consistent and open communication is needed across the many 
players to build trust, assure mutual objectives, and create common 
motivation. 
Backbone Support 
Creating and managing collective impact requires a separate 
organization(s) with staff and a specific set of skills to serve as the 
backbone for the entire initiative and coordinate participating 
organizations and agencies. 
 
 
As indicated in Table 2, which contrasts the features of isolated impact 
with those of CI, perhaps the most striking difference is that large-scale change is 
reliant upon the success of a single organization that would ostensibly be scaled 
larger to affect greater impact.36 In contrast, CI recognizes that complex issues 
require collaboration and effort among several organizations with accompanying 
increases in cross-sector alignment and institutional learning. 
                                            
35 Kania and Kramer, “Collective Impact,” 36–41. 
36 Ibid 
 23
Table 2.   Isolated Impact vs. Collective Impact37 
Isolated Impact vs. Collective Impact 
Isolated Impact Collective Impact 
 Funders select individual grantees that 




 Nonprofits work separately and compete 
to produce the greatest independent 
impact. 
 




 Large-scale change is assumed to 
depend on scaling a single organization. 
 Funders and implementers understand that 
social problems, and their solutions, arise 
from the interactions of many organizations 
within a larger system. 
 
 Progress depends on working toward the 
same goal and measuring the same things. 
 
 
 Large-scale impact depends on increasing 
cross-sector alignment and learning among 
many organizations. 
 
 Organizations actively coordinate their action 
and share lessons learned. 
 
 
2. Examples of Collective Impact 
a. Strive Case Study 
One of the most significant examples of the successful use of the CI 
concept involves efforts by non-governmental organizations to improve the rate 
of high school graduation in the United States. Following World War II, the United 
States had the highest high school graduation rate in the world. Currently, this 
country ranks 18th out of the top 24 industrialized nations. In addition, despite 
billions of dollars of contributions to individual nonprofits alongside the tireless 
efforts of educators and administrators, system-wide progress in improving high 
school graduation rates has been virtually unattainable. In fact, major funders of 
community and social initiatives, such as education reform, teen pregnancy 
reduction, and increased access to medical care, etc., such as the Annenberg 
                                            
37 Kania and Kramer, “Collective Impact,” 36–41. 
 24
Foundation, Ford Foundation, and Pew Charitable Trusts, have abandoned their 
efforts in frustration and acknowledged their lack of progress.38 
In 2006, a nonprofit subsidiary of KnowledgeWorks39 brought together 
local leaders from the greater Cincinnati and Northern Kentucky to address the 
student achievement crisis and improve education in the area. In the four years 
after the partnership was launched, Strive partners40 improved student success 
in dozens of key areas across three large public school districts, and 34 of the 53 
success indicators that Strive tracks have shown positive trends, including high 
school graduation, fourth grade reading and math scores, and the number of 
preschool children prepared for kindergarten.41 Also, in its 2012–2013 
Partnership Report, Strive partners noted that 89 percent of the partnership’s 
measures are showing positive trends; up from 81 in the previous year, and 68 
percent from the three years prior.42 
How Did They Do It? A core group of community leaders, from classroom 
teachers to university presidents, decided to abandon their individual agendas in 
favor of a collective approach to improving student achievement. With 300 
leaders agreeing to participate, the group realized that focusing on one 
component of the educational system would not make much of a difference 
unless all parts of the continuum were improved at the same time. The group 
also soon realized that no single organization could accomplish this improvement 
alone. Therefore, they first focused the entire education community upon a 
singular set of goals; all measured in the same way.43 Further, the group aligned 
                                            
38 Ibid. 
39 KnowledgeWorks is a social enterprise focused on creating sustainable improvement in 
student readiness for college and careers found at http://knowledgeworks.org/. 
40 Strive Partners is a group of leaders from various sectors, including early childhood 
educators, school district superintendents, college and university presidents, business and non-
profit leaders, and community and corporate funders who came together in 2006 to improve 
academic success in Greater Cincinnati’s urban core. 
41 Kania and Kramer, “Collective Impact,” 36–41. 
42 Strive Partnership, Strive Partnership Report 2012–2013 (Cincinnati, OH: Strive 
Partnership, 2013), 5.  
43 Kania and Kramer, “Collective Impact,” 36–41. 
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16 local funders with nine selected grantees spanning the “cradle to career” 
continuum.44  
b. The Elizabeth River Project 
While the term “collective impact” may be new, the concept is not. In 1993, 
Norfolk, Virginia’s Mayor, Marjorie Mayfield Jackson, helped found the Elizabeth 
River Project with the mission of cleaning up the Elizabeth River in southeastern 
Virginia. Over 100 stakeholders, including the city governments of Chesapeake, 
Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Virginia Beach, joined with community groups, as well 
as state and federal partners including the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
and the U.S. Navy to develop an 18-point plan to restore the watershed. Fifteen 
years later, more than 1,000 acres of watershed land have been conserved or 
restored and pollution is down by more than 215 million pounds, the most severe 
concentrations of carcinogens have been reduced sixfold, 27 species of fish and 
oysters are thriving in the restored wetlands, and bald eagles have returned to 
nest on the shores.45 
c. Corporate America Is Also Exploring Collective Impact 
Mars America, the manufacturer of chocolate brands M&M’s and Snickers, 
is working with non-government organizations, local governments, and direct 
competitors to improve the lives of over 500,000 impoverished cocoa farmers in 
Côte d’Ivoire, where Mars sources a large portion of its raw materials. Based on 
research, better farming practices and improved plant stocks could triple yields 
and dramatically increase the incomes of the cocoa farmers while improving the 
practice of Mars’ supply chain.46 
                                            
44 “Quality Continuous Improvement,” Strive Partnership, July 15, 2014, http://www.strive 
partnership.org/priority-area-highlights. 
45 Kania and Kramer, “Collective Impact,” 36–41. 
46 Ibid. 
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3. Potential Problems with Collective Impact 
While no scholarly literature is available that challenges the viability of CI, 
a few arguments have been made about its potential weaknesses. Moreover, 
even though it may be counterintuitive to think the concept of assembling a group 
of organizations that share common interests and goals seems like a productive 
and efficient practice, these collaborations may in fact be problematic.  
Assembling heterogeneous organizations around a common goal requires 
communication and understanding on a greater level to ensure that the goal is 
not lost to misalignment of basic philosophies and strategic vision.47 It has also 
been argued that because nonprofits are comprised of people and funders who 
fervently believe in their unique vision and mission, organizing efforts with other 
participants may be difficult. For example, if a collective impact initiative was 
assembled to stem teenage pregnancies, how could the parties who believe in 
birth control work effectively with those who advocate abstinence?48 In addition, 
considering each organization’s legal and fiduciary responsibilities to support 
ideas consistent with their missions and bylaws, ceding control to a larger group 
could disrupt participant groups and may even rise to legal action. Finally, in the 
event of a successful or failing effort, agreeing on how credit or blame is shared 
can possibly lead to further disputes.49 
4. Evaluating Collaborative Efforts—The National Network of 
Fusion Centers Example 
Irrespective of the type, or goal of any program, measurement and 
evaluation may be the most important component of any collaborative effort. 
Moreover, while true objective measurement can be elusive, it is incumbent upon 
each of the actors to agree upon a common set of metrics by which advances 
                                            





and successes can be measured.50 When considering the implementation of 
performance assessment within the national network, an apparent paradox exists 
between the “top-down” strategic intent of the federal government and the 
“bottom up” reality of the state and local owners of the fusion centers themselves. 
Whereas, the top-down approach is a “centralized process that tends to neglect 
strategic initiatives coming from…other policy subsystems; bottom-up 
implementation is a decentralized process in which policy is determined by the 
bargaining between members of the organization and their clients.”51 It is also 
recognized that the key to implementing any performance management system 
is the organization’s willingness to accept it.52 An interesting example is the 
implementation of performance measures relating to the national network of 
fusion centers. Due to its unique composition, measuring the performance of the 
national network presented several challenges, most notably the following.  
 The diversity of the national network. Since no two fusion centers 
are the same, performance measures that account for the diversity 
of the national network require the identification of common themes 
and approaches that apply to all or most fusion centers.  
 The diversity of fusion center customers: Fusion centers must strike 
a balance between remaining relevant to their local area of 
responsibility and core customer set while supporting national 
priorities. Achieving this balance can be a daunting task since 
fusion centers are owned and operated by state and local 
governments whose priorities may be in conflict. 
 The intangible nature of the terrorism prevention mission area: 
Measuring terrorism prevention is difficult; unless concrete 
evidence proves that the information provided by a fusion center 
led to the arrest of a potential terrorist, it is nearly impossible to 
                                            
50 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, An Act, Pub. L. No. 103–62, 107 Stat. 
285 (1993). 
51 Edward Long and Aimee L. Franklin, “The Paradox of Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act: Top-Down Direction for Bottom-Up Implementation,” Public 
Administration Review 64, no. 3 (May–June 2004): 309–319. 
52 Michael J. Mucha, “Organizational Alignment with Logic Models,” Government Finance 
Review 24, no. 5 (October 2008): 51–54.  
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know if the cumulative actions of a fusion center, or group of 
centers, resulted in the prevention of a terrorist act.53 
Recognizing these challenges, the DHS leveraged the logic model 
approach, which focuses more on an overall understanding of how program 
inputs translate into activities, outputs, and outcomes; from this basis program, 
measures are derived from indicators of success.54 Additionally, the logic model 
captures the national network’s operations at a high enough level to encompass 
most customer requirements, but with enough specificity to allow for the 
development of a full set of performance measures that capture the discrete 
functions of the national network.55 A visual representation of the logic model as 
it applies to the national network in depicted in Figure 6. 
                                            
53 Department of Homeland Security, Performance Measures Definition Guide, ver. 1.0 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, April 2014), 6–7. 




Figure 6.  National Network Logic Model56 
Beginning with the fusion center performance program (FCPP), the DHS, 
through its Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), and State and Local 
Program Office (SLPO), began a program to “capture objective, standardized 
data to evaluate the value and impact of individual centers and the network as a 
whole.”57 The FCPP consisted of three interconnected elements. 
 Measuring the capability and performance of the national network 
through a structured, standardized annual assessment 
 Hosting and participating in prevention-based exercises that test 
fusion center capabilities against real world scenarios 
                                            
56 Department of Homeland Security, 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 4. 
57 Department of Homeland Security, 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report 
5. 
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 Mitigating identified gaps to increase capabilities, improve 
performance, and sustain fusion center operations58 
Further defining the elements of the FCPP, in 2010, the DHS I&A, and 
members of the network identified four critical operational capabilities (COC), and 
four enabling capabilities (EC) that provide a foundation for the fusion process.59 
Using these eight criteria, baseline data relating to the performance of the 
national network was collected and reported in the 2012 Fusion Center Final 
Report. This process was impactful because it provided a consistent measure of 
capability and maturity across a network of ostensibly dissimilar components. 
Another milestone in the evaluation of the national network is the release of the 
2013 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report that builds on previous 
efforts. It is the first report on the national network that captures consistent year-
over data, which lends to a more accurate indicator of real network progress. 
These performance measures are not, however, without debate. It can be argued 
that because of the intangible nature of the work with which fusion centers are 
tasked, and the subjective measure of some of the metrics, the capabilities and 
capacities captured by the assessment may merely be surrogates for qualitative 
impact. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Casual observation of the volume of reports related to the performance of 
government programs clearly indicate its importance to elected officials and the 
public alike. It follows that perhaps the most important feature of any 
collaboration is the proof of a partnership’s impact, which also may be the most 
difficult feature to measure. The next three chapters illustrate how current intra-
organizational efforts align closely with CI theory, although greater coordination 
between similar elements of the enterprise could provide greater results. 
                                            
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., 6. 
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III. REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING CENTERS 




Perhaps the first formalized, multi-jurisdictional collaborative effort 
established between law enforcement agencies was the Regional Organized 
Crime Information Center (ROCIC). Formed over 40 years ago, and still in 
operation today, the ROCIC was the first of six RISS, and was founded with the 
understanding that criminals do not respect jurisdictional boundaries, and often 
travel to commit crimes. Further, realizing that an unmet need existed in sharing 
information across jurisdictions, agency representatives from several states met 
to discuss how they could better address common criminal issues. The 
establishment of the ROCIC became a catalyst for similar regional centers 
across the United States, which ultimately enabled the sharing of criminal 
intelligence, officer safety, and other public safety related information—both 
nationwide and internationally—seamlessly across its technology infrastructure. 
A. HISTORY AND ESTABLISHMENT 
In the late 1960s, and continuing through the early 1990s, several states 
across the southern United States were experiencing a significant problem with 
organized crime. Groups of traveling criminals known as the Dixie Mafia were 
engaged in high-profit burglaries, illegal gambling, prostitution, drugs, and the 
transportation of illegal alcohol and stolen property. Unlike other organized crime 
groups, the Dixie Mafia were not organized as traditional organized crime. In 
other words, no familial or hierarchical structure existed, which made targeting 
leadership and dismantling the groups much more difficult. Further complicating 
the investigation was that the groups of offenders were highly mobile and 
committed their crimes in many states across the southern United States. While 
these groups began by committing lower-level crimes, they became involved in 
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increasingly violent crimes, such as murder-for-hire and engaged in acts of 
violence in an effort to control territory. In addition, following a rash of 25 contract 
killings over six states, 23 senior law enforcement officials from 18 agencies met 
in New Orleans to discuss how they could better share information and 
coordinate their efforts.60 Following the first meeting in New Orleans, quarterly 
meetings were held in Atlanta, and ultimately, the first of the RISS center’s 
ROCIC was established in 1973, which was funded by the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968.61 Since the formation of ROCIC, five other RISS programs have 
been established, each with the initial charge to combat a specific criminal trend 




Figure 7.  RISS Centers Map62  
                                            
60 ROCIC Mississippi Law Enforcement Coordinator, interview with author, July 7, 2014. 
61 Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary 
Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Regional Information Sharing Systems, 
(GAO/GGD-85-17) (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1984). 
62 Regional Information Sharing Systems, Regional Information Sharing Systems Annual 
Report (Washington, DC: Regional Information Sharing Systems, 2013), 2. 
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Each of the project’s area of responsibility is discussed as follows. 
 Rocky Mountain Information Network (RMIN)—Established in 1977, 
the RMIN was established to combat narcotics smuggling across 
the U.S.-Mexican border in four southern counties of Arizona. 
 New England State Police Information Network (NESPIN)—
Established in 1979, NESPIN first focused on organized crime in 
the New England states and grew its mission to support narcotics 
smuggling and distribution. It serves not only the northeastern 
United States, but areas of Canada as well. 
 Mid-States Organized Crime Information Center (MOCIC)—In 
1980, traveling criminals were committing burglaries in several 
states in the Midwest. MOCIC was organized so that several 
jurisdictions could collaborate on case information. 
 Western States Information Network (WSIN)—In 1980, the WSIN 
was organized to support major investigations involving narcotics 
smuggling and distribution in California and several the Pacific Rim 
states. 
 Middle Atlantic Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement 
Network (MAGLOCLEN)—Established in 1981, the last of the 
regional centers to form was the MAGLOCLEN. It was established 
primarily to fight “traditional” organized crime in the northeastern 
and most densely populated part of the country.63 
B. STATED MISSION AND PRIMARY ACTIVITIES 
While each of the RISS centers was formed to combat a specific issue, 
the centers realized that several law enforcement agencies in their area of 
responsibility lacked specific capability and could benefit from enhanced services 
from their center.64 The mission of the centers expanded quickly and the centers 
began to provide their member agencies with a number of services, including the 
following. 
 Information sharing—Perhaps the most frequently used service 
provided by RISS is its web-based technology platform, or 
                                            
63 Regional Information Sharing Systems, Regional Information Sharing Systems Program 
History and Evolution (Washington, DC: Regional Information Sharing Systems, 2013).  
64 ROCIC Mississippi Law Enforcement Coordinator, interview with author. 
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RISSNET™, which provides a secure environment for sharing 
sensitive but unclassified65 information with appropriately vetted 
individuals. 
 Analysis—RISS centers employ analysts to assist member 
agencies in the compilation and analysis of data, computer 
forensics, and preparation of visual materials to aid prosecution. 
These analysts also monitor criminal trends in their region and 
across the nation, and prepare information bulletins, reference 
guides, and other intelligence products for member agencies. 
 Equipment Loans—Inventories of specialized investigative and 
surveillance equipment, including photographic, communications, 
and surveillance equipment is available for member agencies to 
borrow for multijurisdictional investigations. 
 Confidential Funds—Following federal and RISS center guidelines, 
funds are provided by each center that can be used to purchase 
information, contraband, stolen property, and other evidentiary 
items, as well as to pay investigative expenses for 
multijurisdictional investigations. 
 Training—The RISS program supports meetings and conferences 
on emerging issues and criminal trends, and information-sharing 
and analytical techniques. 
 Technical Assistance—Member agencies can request training and 
assistance for activities, such as intelligence analysis and 
installation of specialized equipment.66 
 Event Deconfliction—In the interest of increasing officer safety by 
disambiguation, the RISS program supports a technology solution 
called RISSafe. This technology allows member agencies to add 
planned enforcement activity (i.e., surveillance, search warrants, 
and the presence of undercover officers) into a common database 
with the goal of reducing “blue on blue”67 incidents. 
                                            
65 Sensitive but unclassified (SBU) information is commonly referred to as information not 
classified for national security reasons, but that warrants/requires administrative control and 
protection from public or other unauthorized disclosure for other reasons. 
66 Harold C. Relyea and Jeffrey W. Seifert, Information Sharing for Homeland Security: A 
Brief Overview (CRS Order Code RL32597) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2005).  
67 Blue on blue incidents are commonly defined as direct action against friendly forces who 
are misidentified as threats. 
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C. ORGANIZATION AND FUNDING 
The DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) congressionally funds the 
RISS program through grant awards.68 Moreover, although the funding is 
provided to the RISS program as the larger entity, funds are divided between 
centers by the RISS National Policy Group (RNPG). Heading the RNPG is the 
national coordinator who is responsible for the operation of the RISS program at 
the enterprise level. Additionally, the national coordinator is responsible for 
ensuring that program objectives are met and new opportunities to promote RISS 
initiatives are capitalized upon and identified. The RNPG is comprised of the 
directors of each RISS center along with the chair of each center’s policy board. 
This group makes determinations relating to strategic planning, resolution of 
operational issues, advancement of information-sharing initiatives, and other 
issues regarding the nationwide operation of the program. In addition, each RISS 
center has a policy board that is comprised of representatives from member 
agencies in the center’s multi-state region along with the in-region director. 
Regional policy boards serve as the governing body for each of the individual 
centers and make determinations relating to regional administration, strategy, 
and implementation of national directives.69 
D. HOW RISS MEASURES ITS EFFECTIVENESS 
RISS maintains a comprehensive performance plan and reports and 
analyzes performance on a regular basis. Program effectiveness is measured by 
the delivery and acceptance of RISS reports, data analysis, educational 
products, policy documents, strategic plans, performance measures, and 
feedback from RISS center management and staff and the BJA program office.70 
                                            
68 “Frequently Asked Questions, How is RISS Funded?,” Regional Information Sharing 
Systems, accessed July 15, 2014, http://www.riss.net/default/faq#7. 
69 “Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) Program,” Regional Information Sharing 
Systems, accessed July 15, 2014, https://www.riss.net/default/Overview. 
70 “Frequently Asked Questions,” Regional Information Sharing Systems, accessed July 14, 
2014, https://www.riss.net/Documents/RISS.FAQ.pdf. 
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In addition, an executive summary is produced that provides the following 
information. 
 Number of member agencies and authorized users 
 Seizures, recoveries, and arrests as a result of RISS sponsored 
services 
 Summary of investigative support services 
 Field service activities 
 Use of RISSNET™ resources 
 Database records available via RISSNET™ 
 Inquiries to RISS sources 
 Hits to RISS sources 
 Number of events deconflicted through RISSafe71 
 
E. RISS AND COLLECTIVE IMPACT 
Due to their original and enduring mandates to enhance collaboration and 
information sharing among law enforcement agencies, it could be argued that the 
activities of RISS centers show indications of working within the CI framework. 
However, one important point to note is that the effectiveness of RISS centers as 
a stand-alone entity would be limited without the participation of a secondary 
network of local, state, federal, and tribal member agencies. The result is a three-
tier network, which supports both the needs of individual members and the larger 
goals of the national program. Considering the framework of CI, a lot evidence is 
available to support how RISS centers have embraced the basic elements of CI, 
more specifically as follows. 
                                            
71 “Frequently Asked Questions.” 
 37
1. Common Agenda 
Beginning with the formation of the first RISS center some 40 years ago, 
and continuing to present day operations, RISS centers have engaged their 
membership with the foundational agenda of collaboration and information 
sharing. In addition to the underlying goal of fostering information sharing, sub-
agendas that are topical in nature have developed with the intent to provide 
stakeholders with access to a wider variety of sources. Such is the case with the 
development of the RISSGang™ and RISS’ automated trusted information 
exchange, or ATIX™. RISSGang™ provides users with federated access to 
several state, local, and federal criminal gang databases,72 and ATIX™ is a 
platform on which law enforcement, public safety, and private sector communities 
can share disaster, terrorism, and homeland security information.73 Both these 
information-sharing services support the common agenda of increasing the reach 
of information shared across appropriate audiences. 
2. Shared Measurement 
Measurement of the effectiveness of the RISS program is expressed in 
two separate, but equally important ways, empirically through the volume of work 
completed and through success stories. Internal to the network of RISS centers 
is a set of criteria that illustrates empirically how the network of RISS centers 
executes its core mission and provides value to its member agencies. While most 
these areas of measurement are more indicative of the volume of work rather 
than impact, RISS centers do track arrests, seizures, and forfeitures arising from 
the assistance they provide. RISS centers also capture success stories and 
testimonials, which demonstrate the effectiveness of the system. 
                                            
72 Regional Information Sharing Systems, Regional Information Sharing Systems Annual 
Report, RISSGang Brochure (Washington, DC: Regional Information Sharing Systems, 2013), 
11. 
73 Regional Information Sharing Systems, Regional Information Sharing Systems Annual 
Report, ATIX Brochure (Washington, DC: Regional Information Sharing Systems, 2013), 11. 
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3. Mutually Reinforcing Activities 
Information sharing in and of itself could be construed as a mutually 
reinforcing activity in which all the members of the community have some 
responsibility to share information they have in exchange for other members’ 
data. The number of transactions recorded by the RISS automated systems 
easily proves this activity. In addition, while numerous information-sharing 
initiatives are in existence, which are mostly topical in nature, perhaps the most 
consequential information-sharing effort is the event deconfliction tool provided 
by RISS, named RISSafe™. In 2013, nearly 180,000 events were submitted for 
deconfliction into the RISSafe™ system, with over 73,000 conflicts identified.74 
This activity is deemed so important that California law now requires law 
enforcement agencies to enter enforcement activities into an event deconfliction 
system. 
4. Continuous Communication 
In addition to supporting several information-sharing tools and platforms, 
RISS centers offer training and networking opportunities through a variety of 
training courses, seminars, and conferences. These in-person events, usually 
held three times per year in each region, allow participants to open and maintain 
lines of communication both within their network and among their member 
agencies. Additionally, the RISS project employs law enforcement coordinators 
whose sole purpose is to build relationships with new collaborative partners. In 
support of this mission area, RISS field service representatives conducted over 
20,000 onsite visits with prospective and member agencies across the country.75 
                                            
74 Regional Information Sharing Systems, Regional Information Sharing Systems Annual 
Report, Executive Summary (Washington, DC: Regional Information Sharing Systems, 2013). 
75 Regional Information Sharing Systems, Regional Information Sharing Systems Annual 
Report, Executive Summary. 
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5. Backbone Support 
RISS centers’ primarily receive backbone support from the DOJ and the 
Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR). Whereas the DOJ provides 
funding to sustain the operation of the six RISS centers and the RISS technology 
support center, IIR provides the RISS centers with technical services related to 
ongoing training, project coordination, research, performance measurement and 
evaluation, and analysis of the program.76 
F. CONCLUSION 
It is easy to see that in the 40 years since their establishment, RISS 
centers have validated the core concepts and effectiveness of CI. However, this 
begs the question; must collaboration be framed, or is it more successful when it 
forms organically from an unmet need? One thing is clear in the case of the first 
RISS center. Similarly, interested groups who need to solve complex problems 
seem to unite in pursuit of common goals, even before a formal framework is 
established.  
Further, it could be confidently asserted that the first RISS center, ROCIC, 
grew organically to satisfy a previously unidentified and unmet need. Moreover, 
while strong ties exist among and between the six RISS centers, it could be 
argued that they remain somewhat isolated by their backbone organization and 
segregated information-sharing platform. 
                                            
76 “Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS),” Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 
July 15, 2014, https://www.iir.com/WhatWeDo/Information_Sharing/RISS/. 
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IV. HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA 
INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT CENTERS 
Reducing the Threat by Addressing the Flow 
–Gulf Coast HIDTA motto 
 
 
As a key partner in the domestic intelligence enterprise, HIDTA ISCs 
provide valuable counterdrug intelligence to policy makers, investigators, and law 
enforcement leaders. Also, because it is recognized that a clear link exists 
between crimes associated with drug trafficking and terrorism, and in many 
cases, narcotics-related crimes either provide finance or are precursors to 
terrorism, this intelligence is important to larger homeland security efforts.77 In 
addition, ISCs deliver strategic and tactical intelligence products in an effort to 
better inform the decisions of law enforcement leaders, which can ultimately lead 
to enhanced officer safety, more effective investigative strategy, and more 
efficient resource allocation. This chapter reviews the history of these centers, 
and argues that they are successful largely because they follow the principles of 
CI. 
A. HISTORY AND ESTABLISHMENT 
Declaring that illicit drugs were a threat to U.S. national security, in 1986, 
President Ronald Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 221, 
which, among other things, established the intelligence community as a key 
partner in the fight against illicit drugs. In addition, on November 18, 1988, 
President Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which created the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy to coordinate drug-related legislation, 
                                            
77 “Fusion Centers and HIDTA Investigative Support Centers,” Department of Homeland 
Security, accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers-and-hidta-investigative-
support-centers. 
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security, diplomatic, research and health policy throughout the government.78 
With the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and the ONDCP 
Reauthorization Act of 1998, the ONDCP director was authorized to designate 
areas within the United States that exhibit serious drug trafficking problems as 
HIDTA, or areas.79  
The HIDTA program provides additional federal resources to those areas 
to help eliminate or reduce drug trafficking and its harmful consequences. Law 
enforcement organizations within HIDTAs assess drug trafficking problems and 
design specific initiatives to reduce or eliminate the production, manufacture, 
transportation, distribution, and chronic use of illegal drugs and money 
laundering.80 The reach and coverage of HIDTA is significant. Twenty-eight 
areas have been designated across the United States and its territories (as 
indicated in Figure 8), while nearly 15 percent of all counties and 58 percent of 
the U.S.’ population are included in a HIDTA.81 
                                            
78 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100–690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). 
79 Executive Office of the President, National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, DC: 
HIDTA, Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2004). 
80 “High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program,” The White House, Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, accessed May 1, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/high-
intensity-drug-trafficking-areas-program. 
81 “Fusion Centers and HIDTA Investigative Support Centers.”  
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Figure 8.  HIDTA Regions and ISC Locations82 
B. STATED MISSION AND PRIMARY ACTIVITIES 
Accompanying the additional enforcement resources, HIDTA programs 
bring to an area is an intelligence and case support function known as the ISC. In 
addition to investigative support, ISCs are intended to better inform and focus 
enforcement operations and enhance officer safety. The objective of the HIDTA 
ISC is two-fold. 
 Provide actionable, accurate, detailed, and timely drug and criminal 
intelligence, information, and analytical support to HIDTA 
enforcement initiatives, HIDTA participating agencies, and to other 
law enforcement agencies and intelligence centers  
 
                                            
82 “Fusion Centers and HIDTA Investigative Support Centers.” 
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 Collect, collate, analyze, and disseminate information about 
offenders, crimes, and/or events to law enforcement agencies83  
The above objectives are executed through five specific functions, which 
include the following. 
 Analytical Services—Analytical tradecraft performed by an analyst 
to support an investigation, and includes association/link/network 
analysis, commodity flow analysis, crime-pattern analysis, financial 
analysis, or flow analysis. 
 Threat Assessments—Each HIDTA is required to publish an annual 
threat assessment that documents the drug trafficking in its region. 
In addition, ISCs produce other topical assessments as necessary. 
 Intelligence Products—ISCs are responsible for producing tactical 
operational, and strategic intelligence products. 
 Information Sharing—ISCs should ensure that drug-related 
information is shared from law enforcement, proprietary, and public 
databases with other ISCs, national intelligence centers (e.g., El 
Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) and Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN)), and fusion centers. 
 Deconfliction—ISCs are required to establish a mechanism to 
perform target, case, and event disambiguation.84 
In addition, the ISC is envisioned as a mechanism by, and through which, 
agencies communicate more rapidly and effectively and share intelligence 
resources, with the larger goal of building a common vision and collective 
problem solving techniques.85 
                                            
83 Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Intelligence and Information Sharing,” in Program 
Policy and Budget Guidance (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the White Office, 2009), sec. 
5.0, 5–1—5–6. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Quoted from NPS thesis, Michael J. Gutierrez, “Intelligence and High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Areas (HIDTA’S): A Critical Evaluation of the HIDTA Investigative Support Center” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 11. 
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C. ORGANIZATION AND FUNDING 
Each HIDTA is funded individually by a grant from the ONDCP and 
governed by its own local executive board, typically consisting of 16 members 
with half of the members coming from state and local agencies. While the 
purpose of the local boards is to ensure that federal priorities are carried through, 
a great amount of discretion is granted to ensure that issues unique to the local 
community are addressed in the overall strategy for that HIDTA. Local control is 
reinforced by each executive board’s ability to design and implement its own 
strategy, along with the flexibility to adjust tactics to meet changing conditions.86 
Funding for calendar year 2012 was approximately $238.5 million, and included 
salaries for nearly 1,200 positions.87 
D. HOW HIDTA MEASURES ITS EFFECTIVENESS 
In 2003, the Executive Office of the President, along with the DOJ 
published the newly developed Design for a HIDTA/OCDETF Performance 
Monitoring and Management System. The project’s focus was to first, identify 
law-enforcement program measures specifically relevant to HIDTA (and 
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF)), and second, to 
recommend a method for implementing a management and reporting system for 
the two programs.88 The new evaluation regime is based on a logic model89 
                                            
86 Office of National Drug Control Policy, HIDTA Program Policy and Budget Guidance 
(Washington, DC: Executive Office of the White House, 2012). 
87 National HIDTA Directors Association, HIDTA Program Summary 2012 (Alexandria, VA: 
National HIDTA Directors Association, 2012).  
88 Office of National Drug Control Policy, Design for a HIDTA/OCDETF Performance 
Monitoring and Management System (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the White House, 
2003). 
89 A logic model is a planning tool to clarify and graphically display what your project intends 
to do and what it hopes to accomplish and impact. “Guide 5: Define How a Program Will Work—
The Logi Model,” National Network of Libraries of Medicine, last updated October 5, 2012, 
nnlm.gov/outreach/community/logicmodel.html. 
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(depicted in Figure 9), which seeks the ultimate impact of reduced availability of 
illegal narcotics.90 
 
Figure 9.  HIDTA Logic Model91  
Notwithstanding the logic model and other measures of performance 
mentioned previously, the HIDTA program measures its impact primarily through 
quantitative statistics, more specifically the following. 
 Arrests related to HIDTA supported investigations 
 Seizures of illegally obtained assets 
 The quantity of leads processed and investigations supported 
 
                                            
90 Office of National Drug Control Policy, Design for a HIDTA/OCDETF Performance 
Monitoring and Management System. 
91 Office of National Drug Control Policy, Design for a HIDTA/OCDETF Performance 
Monitoring and Management System, 37. 
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 The number of drug trafficking organizations disrupted or 
dismantled92 
Albeit limited in scope, another project that sought to evaluate the 
performance of the ISC was published in 2009. Titled Using SERVQUAL to 
Assess the Customer Satisfaction Level of the Oregon HIDTA ISC Analytical 
Unit, the report leveraged SERVQUAL, which is a multi-item scale developed to 
assess perceptions of service quality in service and retail businesses. Among the 
dimensions collected were the following. 
 Tangibles—Physical facilities, equipment, staff appearance, etc. 
 Reliability—Ability to perform service dependably and accurately 
 Responsiveness—Willingness to respond to customer need 
 Assurance—Ability of staff to inspire confidence and trust 
 Empathy—The extent to which caring individualized service is 
given93 
This limited study found that, in general, customers (meaning personnel 
using the ISC) were largely satisfied with the services provided by the Oregon 
HIDTA ISC. 
E. HIDTA ISCS AND COLLECTIVE IMPACT 
 Common Agenda–The common agenda binding HIDTAs, their 
associated ISCs, and existing local resources is the idea that the 
narcotics issue in the United States cannot be addressed by the 
individual actions of state, local, and federal agencies working 
individually. Rather, the HIDTA program provides additional 
resources to address the problem; among the most important are 
funding, personnel and information. 
 Shared Measurement–Both through the threat assessment process 
and the reporting of case statistics, each of the HIDTA ISCs 
                                            
92 National HIDTA Directors Association, HIDTA Program Summary 2012. 
93 Chris Gibson, Using SERVQUAL to Assess the Customer Satisfaction Level of the Oregon 
HIDTA ISC Analytical Unit (Portland, OR: Hartfield School of Management, Portland State 
University, 2009). 
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contribute to a consistent enterprise-wide measure of the work it is 
doing and how expenditures are either making the intended impact, 
or why efforts might have been hampered. As mentioned 
previously, measures of impact are largely quantitative, and limited 
attempts have focused on the operation of the enterprise rather 
than the impact of the designated mission. 
 Mutually Reinforcing Activities–Their common mission binds the 
network of HIDTAs and their accompanying ISCs across the nation. 
Additionally, intelligence components reinforce the efforts of the 
entire network and provide guidance via empirical data to guide 
both the activities of field personnel and future policy. 
 Continuous Communication–Empirical data indicate that ISCs are 
in constant communication both internally and throughout the 
network. For example, in 2012, over 50,000 leads were referred 
and over 240,000 events were deconflicted. 
 Backbone Support–The backbone support for the network of 
HIDTA ISCs comes from the ONDCP primarily through funding and 
additional personnel. The ONDCP also provides guidance for 
programmatic activities via its national drug control strategy while 
local boards direct the priorities of individual centers as deemed by 
their leadership. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Similar to the example of the RISS centers, HIDTA ISCs exhibit strong 
alignment with the principles proposed by collective impact. Moreover, even 
though their formation was compelled by statute and not by a natural need to 
collaborate, the HIDTA intelligence system, or ISC, has been described as “an 
indispensable element in the creation and growth of numerous local, state, and 
federal intelligence programs.”94 
                                            
94 Kurt Schmid, “A Foundation for Information Sharing,” Police Chief Magazine 70, no. 11 
(November 2003). 
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V. NATIONAL NETWORK OF FUSION CENTERS 
Homeland security begins with hometown security, and fusion centers 
play a vital role in keeping communities safe all across America 
—Janet Napolitano  
 
The most recent and perhaps most controversial addition to the domestic 
intelligence enterprise is the National Network of Fusion Centers (NNFC) 
Comprised of 78 individual centers located in 49 U.S. states and two territories,95 
the NNFC is ostensibly the nation’s solution for enhancing information-gathering 
and sharing activities on the state and local level to inform the national threat 
picture. Conversely, the NNFC aims to keep state and local entities informed of 
transnational threats, which may have nexus to their community. 
A. HISTORY AND ESTABLISHMENT 
Following the intelligence and information-sharing failures leading up to 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the U.S. 
government began the process of studying the issue and recommended both 
legal and organizational solutions. From 2002–2012, no fewer than eight 
reports96 were published that recommended and guided possible solutions. 
Included in these reports was the 9/11 Commission Report, published in 2002, 
which recommended that information be shared across a wider audience of 
stakeholders and across new networks.97  
                                            
95 The state of Wyoming does not have a designated fusion center; and Guam and Puerto 
Rico both have centers. 
96 These reports included, The 9/11 Commission Report (2002), The National Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing Plan (2003), The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004), 
The Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative: Homeland Security Intelligence and 
Information Fusion (2005), Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and 
Intelligence in a New Era (2006), National Strategy for Information Sharing, Success and 
Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing (2007), Enabling Capabilities for 
State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers (2008), The National Strategy for Information 
Sharing and Safeguarding (2012). 
97 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission 
Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 418. 
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The theme of information sharing for law enforcement was given a 
concrete framework and course of action in the National Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing Plan (NISCP), which was published in 2003. The plan, which was not 
developed solely for fusion centers, arose from the collaboration of the Global 
Intelligence Working Group, which was formed following the 2002 International 
Association of Chiefs of Police Criminal Information Sharing Summit. The vision 
of the working group was to create the following  
 A model intelligence sharing plan 
 A mechanism to promote intelligence-led policing 
 A blueprint for law enforcement administrators to follow when 
enhancing or building an intelligence system 
 A model for intelligence process principles and policies 
 A plan that respects and protects individuals’ privacy and civil rights 
 A technology architecture to provide secure, seamless sharing of 
information among systems 
 A national model for intelligence training 
 An outreach plan to promote timely and credible intelligence 
sharing 
 A plan that leverages existing systems and networks, yet allows 
flexibility for technology and process enhancements98 
Further defining information-sharing protocols, procedures and 
expectations was the IRTPA. The IRTPA called for the creation of the ISE, and 
with relation to the national network of fusion centers, the requirement that the 
ISE will provide and facilitate “the means for sharing terrorism information among 
                                            
98 Department of Justice, National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (Washington, DC: 
Department of Justice, 2003). 
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all appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, and the private sector 
through the use of policy guidelines and technologies.”99 
In 2005, the DHS’s Homeland Security Advisory Council issued a 
document titled Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative: Homeland 
Security and Intelligence Fusion. This document identified that the concept of 
intelligence/information fusion has emerged as the fundamental process to 
facilitate the sharing of homeland security-related information at a national level, 
and therefore, has become a guiding principle in defining the ISE (as required by 
the IRTPA of 2004).100 The document identified the priorities of homeland 
security intelligence/information as efforts to do the following. 
 Identify rapidly both immediate and long-term threats 
 Identify persons involved in terrorism-related activities 
 Guide the implementation of information-driven and risk-based 
prevention, response, and consequence management efforts101 
The document further defined the following, which could ostensibly be 
considered an early roadmap to fusion center standards.  
 How homeland security intelligence/information fusion is the 
overarching process of managing the flow of information and 
intelligence across levels and sectors of government, and the 
private sector to support the rapid identification of emerging 
terrorism-related threats and other circumstances requiring 
intervention by government and private sector entities. 
 
 
                                            
99 Quoted from the National Strategy for the National Network of Fusion Centers, 
Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for the National Network of Fusion Centers 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014). 
100 Homeland Security Advisory Council, “Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative, 




 The importance of involving every level and discipline of 
government, the private sector and the public, and how efforts 
should be organized in a scalable way and on a geographic basis 
so that adjustments can be made based on the operating and/or 
threat environment. 
 A description of the fusion process that includes the following 
activities and could arguably be the predecessor to the intelligence 
cycle adopted by the national network. 
 Management and governance 
 Planning and requirements development 
 Collection 
 Analysis 
 Dissemination, tasking, and archiving 
 Reevaluation 
 Modification of requirements102 
A further definition of the operation of fusion centers was contained in a 
2006 publication titled Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing 
Information and Intelligence in a New Era. The intent of this document was not to 
dictate the emphasis or priorities of individual centers; rather, it was to provide 
newly organized fusion centers with standards and guidelines for operation, as 
well as advice for the effective exchange of information throughout the network. 
Three phases of development (Phase 1—Law Enforcement Intelligence 
Component, Phase 2—Public Safety Component, and Phase 3—Private Sector 
Component) were accompanied by 18 guidelines that were developed to clarify 
the standards for the successful operation of a single center and assist with the 
development of the NNFC. Those guidelines, each with an accompanying 
instructional document, are listed as follows. 
 
 
                                            
102 Homeland Security Advisory Council, “Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative.” 
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Guideline 1:  The NCISP and the Intelligence and Fusion 
Processes 
Guideline 2:  Mission Statement and Goals 
Guideline 3:  Governance 
Guideline 4:  Collaboration 
Guideline 5:  Memorandum of Understanding and Non-
Disclosure Agreement 
Guideline 6:  Database Resources 
Guideline 7:  Interconnectivity 
Guideline 8:  Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Guideline 9:  Security 
Guideline 10:  Facility, Location, and Physical Infrastructure 
Guideline 11:  Human Resources 
Guideline 12:  Training of Center Personnel 
Guideline 13:  Multidisciplinary Awareness and Education 
Guideline 14:  Intelligence Services and Products 
Guideline 15:  Policies and Procedures 
Guideline 16:  Center Performance Measures 
Guideline 17:  Funding 
Guideline 18:  Communications Plan103 
In 2007, the National Strategy for Information Sharing identified state, 
local and tribal entities as “full and trusted partners with the federal government 
in our nation’s efforts to combat terrorism.”104 The document identified three 
areas in which federal departments and agencies could better coordinate efforts 
with their state, local, and tribal counterparts, and also introduced, without 
naming it specifically, the concept of sharing information in an all-crimes, all-
hazards environment. The document mentioned activities, which would enhance 
information sharing, more specifically emphasize the following.  
                                            
103 Department of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information 
and Intelligence in a New Era (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2006). 
104 The White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing, Success and Challenges in 
Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing). 
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 Foster a culture that recognizes the importance of fusing 
information regarding all crimes with national security implications, 
with other security-related information (e.g., criminal investigations, 
terrorism, public health and safety, and natural hazard emergency 
response)  
 Support efforts to detect and prevent terrorist attacks by 
maintaining situational awareness of threats, alerts, and warnings, 
and develop critical infrastructure protection plans to ensure the 
security and resilience of infrastructure operations (e.g., electric 
power, transportation, telecommunications) within a region, state, 
or locality 
 Develop training, awareness, and exercise programs to ensure that 
state, local, and tribal personnel are prepared to deal with terrorist 
strategies, tactics, capabilities, and intentions, and to test plans for 
preventing, preparing for, mitigating the effects of, and responding 
to events105 
In 2008 and 2012, the fusion centers’ role was further refined and defined 
by the publication of Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion 
Centers, and the updated National Strategy for Information Sharing and 
Safeguarding. In these documents, the further development of expertise within 
the NNFC is encouraged and the Network is again identified as a critical partner 
in the collection and analysis of threat-related information.  
With the exception of Wyoming, each state has at least one fusion center, 
and several states have multiple fusion centers, which may be missioned to 
support specific local agencies or to provide analytical support on certain issues. 
While the fusion center concept is not new,106 centers following the homeland 
security model began organizing in 2002, growing to 29 in the year 2005, and 
more than doubling in 2007 to sixty.107 The number currently stands at 78, with 
centers in both Guam and Puerto Rico. 
                                            
105 The White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing, Success and Challenges in 
Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing. 
106 The New York City Police Department had a system in place in the 1990s to ensure 
information was shared between the detective, patrol, and organized crime sections. 




Figure 10.  Map of DHS Designated Fusion Centers108 
B. STATED MISSION AND PRIMARY ACTIVITIES 
A common theme woven throughout several national-level documents is 
the idea that the principal activity of a fusion center is to facilitate the sharing of 
information. Recognizing the unique capabilities of its member centers, and 
emergent nature of the NNFC, the mission statement for the national network 
remains quite general in nature.  
The mission of the National Network is to use the capabilities 
unique to the NNFC and the state and major urban area fusion 
centers included in the National Network to receive, analyze, 
disseminate, and gather threat information and intelligence in 
support of state, local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and federal 
efforts to protect the homeland from criminal activities and events, 
including acts of terrorism.109 
In addition, considering that many fusion centers have specific topical 
focus, it can be accurately stated that their primary goal is to enhance public 
                                            
108 Department of Homeland Security, 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers Final 
Report. 
109 Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for the National Network of Fusion 
Centers. 
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safety through the timely sharing of relevant information with the most 
appropriate audience. 
C. ORGANIZATION AND FUNDING 
The centers that comprise the Network are owned and operated by a 
variety of state and/or local government organizations, and therefore, are each 
organized in a unique way. Whereas some centers are operated by a state police 
agency with dedicated personnel, others function more like a task force with 
individuals from many agencies who are detailed to the center. It follows that the 
funding mechanism for each center is equally as unique.  
Several federal funding sources are available to support the NNFC. The 
largest is the state homeland security grant program. In addition, the DOJ makes 
funding available through its Office of Community Oriented Policing Services and 
the Bureau of Justice Assistance. Funding can also be dependent upon the 
partners present, as funding and assistance is available from the Department of 
Health and Human Services for centers that include a public health element. 
In recent years, and with the encouragement of the DHS, the NNFC has 
been urged to formulate operational sustainment plans, which rely less on federal 
dollars and more on state and local stakeholder funding. State and local 
sustainment has taken hold as evidenced in the reduced level of federal 
investment in fusion centers; in 2013, direct federal investment decreased by 10 
percent, and in 13.3 percent in the previous year. In the years 2011 through 
2013, direct federal investment declined by 28.5 percent.110 
D. HOW THE NATIONAL NETWORK OF FUSION CENTERS MEASURES 
ITS EFFECTIVENESS 
Beginning in 2010, and as a follow on to the document Fusion Center 
Guidelines, the National Strategy for Information Sharing, the Baseline 
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, the Network sought 
                                            
110 Department of Homeland Security, 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers Final 
Report. 
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to measure its progress in building capacity through FCPP, which consists of the 
following three activities. 
 Measuring the capability and performance of the national network 
through a structured, standardized annual assessment 
 Hosting and participating in prevention-based exercises that test 
fusion center capabilities against real-world scenarios 
 Mitigating identified gaps to increase capabilities, improve 
performance, and sustain fusion center operations111 
More focused on assessing the maturity level of the network, the FCPP 
collected data from each of the centers with respect to its progress in building 
core capabilities (described in more detail in subsequent sections).112 The initial 
assessment process has since grown from a basic measure of capability, to a 
more robust assessment of performance. The 2013 National Network of Fusion 
Centers Final Report, released in June 2014, represents the third iteration of a 
repeatable annual assessment process with objective and standardized data to 
measure year-over-year progress.113 
E. COLLECTIVE IMPACT AND THE NATIONAL NETWORK OF FUSION 
CENTERS 
1. Common Agenda 
Apart and aside from its mission statement, which knits together the 
strategic intent and larger objectives of the Network, the common agenda can be 
identified in the specific elements of the fusion center logic model. The NNFC’s 
logic model captures with greater specificity the how of the NNFC’s common 
agenda, the activity within and between centers, and the intended impact of the 
Network’s operation in four general terms. 
                                            
111 “Fusion Center Performance Program (FCPP),” Department of Homeland Security, last 
updated August 14, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-performance-program-fcpp. 
112 Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for the National Network of Fusion 
Centers. 
113 Department of Homeland Security, 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers Final 
Report. 
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 Inputs—resources provided to operate the NNFC 
 Processes—the actual work completed by the NNFC 
 Outputs—the product of the processes 
 Outcomes—the benefit and/or impact of the efforts of the NNFC114 
2. Shared Measurement 
Considering the unique nature of a network comprised of vastly dissimilar 
components, and recognizing the need to create a standardized method of 
determining the maturity and robustness of the NNFC, two categories of network-
wide capability, comprised of several common tasks provide a framework for 
measurement. Critical operational capabilities and enabling capabilities, not only 
assess capability, but also ensure the ability to perform tasks is aligned with the 
strategic intent of the NNFC. 
The critical operational capabilities are the following. 
 Receive: Ability to receive classified and unclassified information 
from federal partners. 
 Analyze: Ability to assess local implications of that threat through 
the use of a formal risk assessment process. 
 Disseminate: Ability to further disseminate that threat information to 
other state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector entities within 
their jurisdiction. 
 Gather: Ability to gather locally generated in formation, aggregate it, 
analyze it, and share it with federal partners as appropriate. 
The enabling capabilities are as follows. 
 Privacy, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) Protections: The 
ability and commitment to protect the P/CRCL of all individuals. 
                                            
114 Department of Homeland Security, 2013 National Network of Fusion Centers Final 
Report. 
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 Sustainment Strategy: The ability to establish and execute a 
sustainment strategy to ensure the long-term growth and maturity 
of the network. 
 Communications and Outreach: The ability to develop and execute 
a communications and outreach plan. 
 Security: The ability to protect the security of the physical fusion 
center facility, information, systems, and personnel.115 
3. Mutually Reinforcing Activities 
It could be reasonably argued that each of the fusion centers in the NNFC, 
by virtue of their universally accepted mission, reinforces each other’s activities 
and are united by a common set of goals as indicated in its national strategy. 
Further, through its development of homeland security standing information 
needs (HSEC SINS), the DHS has provided a framework of common information-
gathering priorities for the NNFC. This framework, however, is not inflexible or 
arbitrary; understanding that each geographic area serviced by a fusion center 
faces unique issues, each center, based on its own assessment, formulates its 
own set of standing information needs (SINs) and priority intelligence needs 
(PINs) By sharing SINS and PINS between centers and the Network, regional or 
national collaborative partnerships can be formed among centers that have 
identified common priorities that can lead to joint intelligence production and 
enhanced efficiency. 
4. Continuous Communication 
Robust and ongoing communication throughout the NNFC is a necessity 
considering its information-sharing mission. It is executed through a variety of 
means, both in-person meetings, and technology solutions, such as the 
                                            
115 Department of Homeland Security, Critical Operational Capabilities for State and Major 
Urban Area Fusion Centers: Gap Mitigation Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, December 2010), 3. 
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Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN),116 to ensure that information 
flows both vertically and horizontally to all critical mission partners. In addition, 
organizations, such as the National Fusion Center Association and Southeast 
Regional Fusion Center Association, or “Southern Shield,” advocate for national 
and regional priorities and participate in strategic planning for the network. 
5. Backbone Support 
Due to the wide and varied organization structure of fusion centers, each 
center may receive its backbone support from a different agency. However, on 
the larger scale, the national network receives its true backbone support from the 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis through the SLPO of the DHS. The SLPO 
provides individual centers in the network with the majority of guidance and 
assistance with capability and capacity building activities, including the following. 
 Give technical assistance that can range from policy development 
to privacy reviews 
 Provide security clearances and access to classified and sensitive 
but unclassified data systems 
 Coordinate training deliveries for fusion center personnel and their 
critical mission partners 
 Sponsor travel to attend collaborative meetings  
 Assist with analytical capacity 
 
 
                                            
116 The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is the trusted network for homeland 
security mission operations to share SBU information. Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, 
international, and private sector homeland security partners use HSIN to manage operations, 
analyze data, send alerts and notices, and in general, share the information they need to do their 
jobs. “Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN),” Department of Homeland Security, last 
updated July 17, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-information-network.  
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F. CONCLUSION 
As sharing national security information among the widest appropriate 
audience is a national priority, and is too large a job for any single organization to 
accomplish successfully, the NNFC is a prime example of how collective impact 
finds practical application. It could also be confidently stated that even though 
individual fusion centers tend to focus on issues specific to their area of 
responsibility, they understand that they are bonded to a larger strategic effort. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 




Considering the evidence presented in the forgoing chapters, it would be 
hard to deny that the principles of CI are practiced internally within RISS centers, 
HIDTA ISCs and the NNFC. This viewpoint stands to reason because these 
networks have well-defined missions, and have institutionalized their policies, 
processes, and procedures. Moreover, considering that each of these networks 
“touch” each other’s missions, it would be constructive to examine how CI is 
being leveraged between these organizations and where opportunities exist for 
greater levels of collaboration. 
A. COLLECTIVE IMPACT BETWEEN SELECTED ELEMENTS OF THE 
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE 
1. Common Agenda 
Perhaps the most obvious statement of common agenda appears on the 
DHS’s website, which describes that the activities of RISS centers, HIDTAs, and 
fusion centers complement one another: 
As such, the missions of fusion centers, RISS centers, and HIDTAs 
are complementary and require on-going coordination. Knowledge, 
expertise, relationships, and information held by RISS centers is 
invaluable to assist fusion center partners in identifying and 
analyzing homeland security threats.117 
and 
Both fusion centers and ISCs are responsible for protecting our 
nation by serving as valuable conduits for information sharing 
among federal, state, local and tribal agencies. Their missions are 
                                            
117 “Fusion Centers and RISS Centers,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed June 
26, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers-and-riss-centers. 
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not isolated; to the contrary, counterdrug and counterterrorism 
efforts both address specific criminal activities that impact our 
homeland security.118 
2. Shared Measurement 
Concerning areas in which RISS centers and HIDTA ISCs seem to 
measure their performance and impact quantitatively (e.g., number of arrests, 
seizures, etc.), fusion centers express their impact in a more anecdotal fashion, 
noting success stories, volume of analytical capacity, and added value. Since 
substantial commonality in mission occurs between these elements, the 
opportunity exists to develop a method of measurement, which focuses on the 
outcomes of activities that are identical across the enterprise. 
3. Mutually Reinforcing Activities 
Several examples of mutually reinforcing activities are available across the 
enterprise, the most consequential of which may be a recent project undertaken 
by a RISS center located in the northeastern United States, the NESPIN. 
NESPIN proposes the federation of the criminal intelligence databases from the 
17 fusion centers in the region in an effort to share information seamlessly across 
the region using the RISSIntel platform.119 Another similar, yet no less impactful 
action undertaken by the DHS and the RISS centers is the federation of their 
automated information-sharing platforms, the Homeland Security Information 
Network (HSIN) and RISSIntel. Finally, participation in groups, such as the 
Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, the Criminal Intelligence 
Coordinating Council, and the Information Sharing Environment, even though 
compelled by law, still represents a major commitment to coordinate joint plans of 
action for common issues. 
                                            
118 “Fusion Centers and HIDTS Investigative Support Centers,” Department of Homeland 
Security, accessed June 26, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers-and-hidta-investigative-
support-centers. 
119 Northeast Fusion Center Intelligence Information Sharing Pilot Project, June 28, 2013. 
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4. Continuous Communication 
In line with the activities listed above, it would be expected that RISS 
centers, ISCs, and fusion centers remain in continuous communication and strive 
to build trust across the enterprise. One specific example of this ongoing effort is 
the fusion center network’s unified message120 relating to event, case, and 
investigative target disambiguation. Leveraging technologies provided both by 
RISS (RISSafe), and HIDTA (SAFETNet and Case Explorer), ISCs, fusion 
centers and RISS centers routinely share information to better focus investigative 
resources and enhance officer safety. 
5. Backbone Support 
Even though RISS centers, HIDTA ISCs and fusion centers’ funding, chain 
of command, and program management mechanisms remain largely segregated, 
several associated organizations could be construed as “backbones.” The IIR 
and the BJA both provide resources and skills to coordinate the efforts of the 
enterprise. Among many activities sponsored by IIR is invitational travel for fusion 
center leaders to attend HIDTA ISC workshops and the BJA’s support of 
meetings and conferences provide opportunities for enhanced collaboration. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This thesis has intended to frame three elements of the domestic 
intelligence enterprise that are primarily missioned to serve and provide 
information-sharing facilities for state and local partners in the context of CI. 
However, opportunities exist for further investigation and research, which are well 
beyond the scope of this work, may benefit each of the parties (RISS centers, 
HIDTA ISCs, and fusion centers) and increase the effectiveness and impact of 
their work. Additional areas of research will most likely involve a longer-term 
examination of specific activity, and will likely involve the collection and statistical 
                                            
120 In October 2013, 14 criminal intelligence-coordinating organizations, led by the national 
network of fusion centers, issued a call to action to enhance officer safety using event 
deconfliction systems. 
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analysis of large amounts of raw data, personal interviews, and meetings with 
several domestic intelligence stakeholders. 
Some recommendations and possible areas for further research are listed 
as follows. 
 Explore policy changes that would allow longer-range funding with 
respect to strategic, impactful goals rather than funding based on 
year–to-year volume.  
In the current model, funding is provided on a year-by-year basis, which 
limits strategic planning and long-term project development. In addition, 
some grant regulations prohibit contracts spanning longer than the 
grant’s typical one-year cooperative agreement, which can limit strategic 
purchasing decisions especially in the information technology realm. 
 
 Mutually shared collection and reporting priorities should be 
codified and areas of specialty should be established within and 
between members of the enterprise. 
Rather than building redundant capability, where practical, similar 
missions should be assigned to the organization best equipped and 
trained.  
 
 The already strong relationships between practitioners should be 
leveraged to encourage funding agencies to streamline evaluation 
criteria and investment justification. 
A funding formula for elements with common or shared missions should 
be developed to encourage more joint funding and avoid funding 
redundant programs. 
 
 Continue federation of information-sharing systems and duplicate 
the efforts currently being undertaken by NESPIN.  
 Design a program of research and analysis along with a 
comprehensive battery of common metrics, which empirically 
represent the relationship between information sharing, collective 
effort and associated impacts on established goals and objectives. 
Several metrics capture the volume of activity. However, these may only 
be a surrogate for real impact. A collection and analysis of the relationship 
between information shared and desired outcomes would be useful.  
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 Recognize that the value of competitive analysis between elements 
of the enterprise and develop a non-punitive “red team” process 
between elements. In addition, RISS centers and ISCs should be 
invited to participate in fusion center exercises. 
C. CONCLUSION 
No doubt exists that the domestic intelligence enterprise in the United 
States serves a very impactful purpose and the capabilities built have enhanced 
and encouraged collaboration on levels never before imagined. Whether 
established by legal mandate, in response to a crisis, or a natural need to 
cooperate, deliberate and planned collaboration has replaced most of the 
“random acts of partnership”121 from the past. However, giving credit to the 
successes to date, any enterprise, which is so complex and has such a far-
reaching mission, can benefit from the innovation and fresh inquiry collective 
impact offers. 
                                            
121 “The ‘How To’ Guide,’ Collaboration for Impact,” accessed July 15, 2014, http://www. 
collaborationforimpact.com/the-how-to-guide/. 
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